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THE ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA
I. INTRODUCTION
We in the Americas must increase our international support for the princi-
ples of justice, freedom, and human dignity-for the organized concern of
the community of nations remains one of the most potent weapons in the
struggle against the degradation of human values.
- Henry Kissinger'
The occurrence of systematic violations of fundamental human rights in
most Latin American nations has increased drastically within the past 15
years.' In 1975 alone, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
examined approximately 300 communications from individuals or organi-
zations denouncing alleged violations of the human rights3 embodied in the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.4 Indeed, more than
80 percent of all reported incidents of serious torture have occurred in
Latin America.'
Recently several nongovernmental organizations, originally established
to express this "organized concern" over such violations, have tried to
implement internationally recognized human rights in Latin America.
This Note will attempt to describe the primary nongovernmental organiza-
tions involved and their efforts to promote human rights in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the United States Congress and
the Department of State. Attention will be focused on the following organi-
zations: International League for Human Rights, International Commis-
sion of Jurists, Amnesty International, United States Catholic Conference,
National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States, and the
Human Rights Issues at the Sixth Regular Session of the Organization of American States
General Assembly: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the
House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) (statement by
Secretary of State Kissinger) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as OAS Hearing].
I THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Rzpor 1975-76 83 (1976) [hereinafter cited as THE AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-761. This report points out that the deterioration in the human
rights situation in Latin America is particularly noticeable in the cono sur countries - Chile,
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay - which also have the highest socioeconomic and cultural
standards in Latin America. Whereas less developed countries such as Paraguay, Nicaragua
and Haiti, with stable autocratic regimes, had the highest number of political prisoners more
than a decade ago, today the more developed countries can claim this dubious distinction.
I Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ANNUAL REPORT, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.
P/AG doc. 632/76, at 83 (1976).
1 Reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HuMAN RIGHTS, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING
RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, OAS OFF. REc., OEA/ser. L/v/Il. 23, Doc. 21 (English)
Rev. 2, at 15 [hereinafter cited as IACHR HANDBOOK].
I THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPoRr 1975-76, supra note 2, at 84.
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Washington Office on Latin America. To be sure, this is not an exhaustive
list; rather, it represents those organizations which the authors believe to
be the most active and most effective. From an examination of these a
pattern of action characteristic of other involved nongovernmental organi-
zations can be discerned.
II. BACKGROUND
Most human rights violations in Latin America are sanctioned by mili-
tary or dictatorial regimes.' In large part, the human rights problems that
have arisen from the repressive methods of security forces have been reac-
tions to the violence used by leftist revolutionary groups in the 1960's.1 The
military governments now in control justified the overthrow of their prede-
cessors on the ground that basic political institutions had been infiltrated
by collaborators with the revolutionary left, thus paralyzing the efforts of
security forces against subversive movements.' After taking over, many
Latin American governments instituted a "state of siege" and suspended
many fundamental rights in order to control the activities of dissident
groups. Thus, the military leaders have crippled leftist extremism, but in
the process they have condoned murder, torture, arbitrary political deten-
tion and many other abuses of human rights.'
A national security state is created when the government, which faces
little in the way of external threats, responds to internal disturbances.,"
Violence becomes institutionalized as violations of human rights are re-
garded as effective instruments of the maintenance of power." When viol-
' Of the 24 OAS members, 13 are military controlled regimes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru
and Uruguay; two more are run by civilian dictators: Haiti and Grenada. Omang, Debate on
Human Rights Dominated OAS Conference, Wash. Post, June 20, 1976, §B, at 7, col. 6; see
also Military Regimes in Latin America, 17 ITr'L COMM'N OF JUiusTS REv. 13 (1976).
1 de Onis, U.S. and Latins: Violations of Rights vs. Aid from Congress, N.Y. Times, Oct.
4, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
1 Id. The United States has justified military assistance to these regimes by claiming that
such aid was required to promote "internal security" and "stability" which are necessary to
achieve developmental progress in those countries. Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala,
and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
129 (1976) (statement by Don Etchison) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights in Central
America Hearings].
9 Rosenblum, Human Rights Fall in Latin America, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 31, 1976, §1,
at 5, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Rosenblum].
'0 However, one observer recently noted the potential for armed conflict between Russian-
supported Peru and Chile. The observer stated that Chile would be the underdog partly
because it has found modern weapons almost impossible to buy since the United States and
Great Britain have imposed tight embargoes on arms sales because of its callous record on
human rights. TmE, Jan. 10, 1977, at 24.
" Brazil's Disgrace, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 17, 1974, §2, at 4, col.1.
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ence so permeates the society, even the lifting of the "state of siege" will
not assure the discontinuance of violations since upper echelon govern-
ment officials may not know or may avoid knowing what is happening at
the local level.'2 Thus, even if, government policy were modified to reflect
a more enlightened view of human rights, it would probably be a long time
before such policy could be instituted at the local level where most viola-
tions occur.
3
III. THE NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
The first three nongovernmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as
NGOs) discussed-International League for Human Rights, International
Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International-represent interna-
tionally-based, nonsectarian NGOs concerned exclusively with promoting
the observance of human rights standards. NGOs in the second group-
United States Catholic Conference, National Council of Churches and
the Washington Office on Latin America-are nationally-based, church-
related organizations which represent the human rights arm of their re-
spective denominations.'4
A. The International League for Human Rights"
Founded in 1942, the International League for Human Rights (ILHR) is
both the oldest and the smallest of the three international NGOs herein
examined.'" Operating from its New York City headquarters, it seeks to
promote human rights worldwide, although it is active primarily in West-
" Charges of gross violations of human rights in Nicaragua, for example, did not begin with
the declaration of the "state of siege." Human Rights in Central America Hearings, supra
note 8, at 81 (statement of Rev. William L. Wipfler, Director, Caribbean and Latin America
Department, National Council of Churches); see also Torture and Oppression in Brazil:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brazil
Hearing], where Rev. J. Ryan Hehir of the United States Catholic Conference testified that:
"I personally am inclined to think that President Geisel [Brazil] is wanting to reduce at any
rate the level of repression, if for no other reason than for public relations and world opinion.
But I think that the monster has been created and has been given a free hand for so long it
is extremely difficult to control it."
'3 Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 5.
,OAS Hearing, supra note 1, at 19.
The International League for Human Rights was formerly called the International
League for the Rigths of Man. It was founded by civil-libertarian Roger Baldwin (who also
founded the American Civil Liberties Union) initially to provide support for European refu-
gees. For a more detailed discussion of ILHR see Wiseberg and Scoble, Human Rights NGOs:
Notes Toward Comparative Analysis, 9 HUMAN RIGHTS J. (No. 4) (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Human Rights NGOs]; Wiseberg and Scoble, International League for Human Rights:
The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 289 (1977).
1a ILHR has approximately 2000 members and 31 national affiliates. See INTERNATIONAL
LEAGUE FOR THE RIrHTS OF MAN ANNUAL REVIEW 1974-75 36-42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
ILHR ANNUAL REVIEW 1974-75].
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ern industrialized nations." Its 35 national affiliates, unlike the national
sections of the International Commission of Jurists or Amnesty Interna-
tional, are independent civil libertarian organizations, such as the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, which provide information on human rights
violations. In Communist and Third World countries where no national
affiliates exist, ILHR depends upon interested "correspondents" to provide
this information.' s
Policy decisions are made by ILHR's International Board of Directors,
composed mainly of United States residents," and by its International
Advisory Committee, usually made up of nonresidents. 20 Administrative
functions are handled by an Executive Director with a small staff assisted
by volunteers.2'
ILHR accepts no government funds to support its operations. 2 Because
of this policy and the lack of support from major foundations, ILHR de-
pends largely on membership fees and contributions to raise money for its
budget. 3 Despite minimal resources, ILHR has contributed to the promo-
tion of human rights in Latin America by sending investigative missions
and protesting to offending governments . 2
,1 Id. Some ILHR affiliates are particularly active in Latin America, e.g. London's Anti-
Slavery Society and New York City's Inter-American Association for Democracy and Free-
dom. These affiliates have been especially interested in the plight of Indians in Paraguay and
Brazil.
11 According to ILHR's Executive Director, this inability to exist stems from the fact that
in Communist countries autonomous human rights groups are prohibited and in developing
countries affiliates are rare because of the lack of a civil libertarian tradition and the exten-
siveness of authoritarian governments. Human Rights NGOs, supra note 15 at -.
"_ E.g., Richard N. Gardner, United States Ambassador-designate to Italy and Professor
of Law at Columbia, is a member of the International Board of Directors.
' E.g., Dr. Justino Jimenez de Arechaga of Uruguay, former Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights member and a judge on the International Court of Justice, is a member of
the International Advisory Committee. See International Protection of Human Rights: The
Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on For-
eign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1974) [hereinafter cited as International Protection of
Human Rights Hearings].
21 Id. at 410. Because of inadequate resources to research and seek corrective action on all
violations which come to its attention, ILHR joined with the Council of New York Law
Associates to form the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights. "[L]awyers can
be effective researchers and negotiators in seeking to convince countries in which violations
of individual human rights become known that such violations should be remedied." Boggan,
The Young Lawyer and Public Interest, N.Y.L.J., June 30, 1975, at 1, col.. 1.
2 The International League for Human Rights, HUmAN RIGHTS BULLTN 13 (Oct., 1976)
[hereinafter cited as ILHR HUMAN RIGHrs BuLLETIN].
0 ILHR ANNUAL REVmw 1974-75 supra note 16, at 1; see also International Protection of
Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 410; but see Human Rights Internships Available,
5 INT'L L. NEWS 7 (Oct. 1976).
1, Since 1974, ILHR has sent investigative missions to Paraguay and Chile and protested
[Vol. 7:477
19771 ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
B. The International Commission of Jurists
In 1952 the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) was established
to follow up inquiries into abuses of justice in the Warsaw Pact countries.2 5
Recognizing, however, that a truly international NGO could not limit its
concerns to a specific georgraphic area or political system, ICJ today seeks
to promote respect for human rights worldwide through the "Rule of
Law."2 ICJ has more than 50 national sections of lawyersz which inform
it about legal developments in their respective countries, undertake re-
search, and in some countries play a leading role in law reform.28
The Commission consists of at most 40 distinguished jurists representing
the legal systems of the noncommunist world.2' Policy decisions are made
by a five member executive committee ° Its Geneva-based International
Secretariat accomplishes the organization's day-to-day work by relying on
violations to the governments of Uruguay, Haiti, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago.
See generally Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 161 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings]; ILHR HUMAN
RIGHTS BUuEIN, supra note 22, at 6-8; ILHR ANNUAL REviEw 1974-75, supra note 16, at 23-
28.
11 International Commission of Jurists, OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONS, AcTivmEs 3 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as ICJ Ow-cTnm].
ICJ has defined the "Rule of Law" as:
The principles, institutions and procedures, not always identical, but broadly
similar, which the experience and traditions of lawyers in different countries of the
world, often having themselves varying political structures and economic back-
ground, have shown to be important to protect the individual from arbitrary gov-
ernment and to enable him to enjoy the dignity of man.
Id. at 1. ICJ, however, realizes that:
the formal observance of the rights of the individual is not enough, and that the
jurist cannot ignore the material problems of his community. The Rule of Law thus
emerges as a dynamic concept which should be employed out not only to safeguard
and advance the civil and political rights of the individual in a free society, but also
to promote the social, economic and cultural conditions under which his legitimate
aspirations may be realized.
Id. at 3; see also International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 2.
" In 1974 ICJ had 56 national sections, 15 of which were in Latin America: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nic-
aragua, Peru, Puerto Rico, Trinidad/robago, Uruguay, Venezuela. 15 Y.B. INTERNATIONAL
ORGANZATIONS 284-85 (1974).
2 ICJ OJEcTlVs, supra note 25, at 5.
2 In 1976, for example, there were 37 commissioners from 35 countries, including jurists
from Africa, Asia, Latin America as well as Western Europe, North America, Australia and
New Zealand. See generally International Commission of Jurists, ANNUAL REwoir July 1975-
June 1976 [hereinafter cited as ICJ ANNUAL Rmo-r 1976].
0 ICJ OaEcTvES, supra note 25, at 4; see also 15 Y.B. INTERNATIONAL OGANIZATIONS 284-
85 (1974).
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a small administrative and legal staff.3 1 The support from prominent mem-
bers of the international legal community facilitates ICJ's financing and
its acceptability. 32
Originally ICJ's operations were financed by contributions from United
States lawyers and private foundations. However, since 1970, ICJ has re-
lied more on government grants and other special funds.33 Despite its mea-
ger budget, ICJ has sent missions to various Latin American countries 3'
dispatched trial observers to others,3 5 interceded privately with govern-
ments 3 concerning human rights conditions, published a report on asylum
in Latin America 37 and distributed its semiannual Review which discusses
the human rights environment in many Latin American countries. 8
C. Amnesty International
Conceived in 1961 by a London attorney, Amnesty International (AI)
began as a temporary public campaign to achieve amnesty for Portugese
31 In 1974, ICJ had eight paid staff members, 15 Y.B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 284
(1974); see also International Commission of Jurists, BASIC FACTS 5 (1962).
n Human Rights in Chile: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs and
on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d
Cong. 75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chile Hearings, Pt. 1.
" ICJ's Secretary General Niall MacDermot testified that ICJ funds from lawyers and
private foundations were reduced because foundations: (1) became interested in other sub-
jects; (2) felt general funding should not come from foundation grants; and (3) had pressures
to spend less money abroad. As of 1973, ICJ received grants from 17 different countries
including the United States. The government funds, however, go to the national sections, not
the International Secretariat. International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note
20, at 13-14, 812-14. In 1972, 55 percent of ICJ's budget came from government sources.
However, that did not include special grants for particular purposes outside the government.
Thus, under 50 percent of the budget was actually financed by governments. Human Rights
in Africa: Hearing Before Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974). Special funding for ICJ's
Chile mission was provided by United States Protestant church groups. Chile Hearings, Pt.
I, supra note 32, at 75.
" Missions were sent to Argentina, REPORT OF MISSION TO ARGENTINA (1975); to Uruguay,
REPORT OF MISSION TO URUGUAY WITH 1975 AN 1976 SUPPLEMENTS (1976) [hereinafter cited as
AI-ICJ URUGUAY MISSION]; and to Chile, Human Rights in Chile: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on International Organizations and Movements and on Inter-American Affairs of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. II, at 43 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Chile Hearing Pt. Ill.
11 Observers were dispatched to trials in Chile, Ecuador and Colombia. International
Commission of Jurists, ANNUAL REPORT, June 1974-June 1975, at 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as ICJ ANNUAL REPORT 1975].
- ICJ interceded with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uru-
guay and Trinidad and Tobago. ICJ ANNUAL REPORT 1976, supra note 29, at 10.
' Id. at 2.
THE REVIEW discusses Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and
Uruguay. ICJ ANNUAL REPORT 1975, supra note 35, at 1.
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university students jailed for their peaceful protest against the Salazar
regime. 9 Today as one of the most viable and largest human rights NGOs,"
AI seeks observance throughout the world of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights," particularly articles 5, 9, 18 and 19.2
The cornerstone of Al's organization is the "adoption group," which
works for the release of "Prisoners of Conscience." 3 The "adoption groups"
are affiliated with national sections which send delegates to the annual
International Council." While each national section has considerable au-
tonomy, it is the Council which decides AI's policy.'5 An eight member
International Executive Committee implements the Council's decisions."
The International Secretariat in London conducts the daily affairs'7 of the
organization by coordinating activities for national sections and "adoption
groups" and researching alleged human rights violations."8
AI is funded principally by contributions from national sections.' 9 Al-
" Human Rights NGOs, supra note 15, at _; see also Wiseberg and Scoble, Human
Rights and Amnesty International, 43 ANNALS 17 (1974).
,0 Weissbrodt, The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implemen-
tation of Human Rights, 12 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 293, 297 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Weissbrodt]; see also THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPoRT 1975-76, supra note 2, at 10.
" G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/A10 (1948). Compliance with the Declaration is sought under
the Statute of Amnesty International §1, as amended by the Eighth International Council
Meeting, Sept. 12-14, 1975 [hereinafter cited as AI Statute].
'" International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 532. Article 5: No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. Article 18: Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or beliefs, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observ-
ance. Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
4 THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-76], supra note 2, at 200; see AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, HANDBOOK FOR GROUPS [hereinafter cited as Al HANDBOOK]. "Adoption groups" do
not work for prisoners arrested by their own government in order that such groups will be
less threatened by government retaliation. In addition to "adoption groups" there are "action
groups" which undertake general campaigns, fund raising and publicity; "coordination
groups," established to assist and support the work of "adoption groups" and to advise the
national section executive on particular geographical regions or countries; and "CAT groups"
(Campaign for the Abolition of Torture) which dispatch telegrams or letters to offending
governments. For an explanation of "Prisoners of Conscience" and the operation of "adoption
groups," see text at note 95 infra.
" Al Statute, supra note 41, at §13.
" AI HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 1.
" AI Statute, supra note 41, at §§25-35.
47 Id. §36.
" THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPOr 1975-76, supra note 2, at 211.
, Id. at 211-12. In 1976, a promotion and fund-raising campaign was initiated by AI to raise
substantial funds for "Prisoners of Conscience Year" 1977. The Federal Republic of Germany
1977]
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though its budget is much larger than that of either ILHR or ICJ,50 it
suffers from the same problem of limited financing because it also main-
tains a larger permanent administrative staff, particularly for research.
Nevertheless, AI has sent several investigative missions to Latin America;"'
privately interceded for human rights victims with the governments of
most Latin American countries; 2 has directed the Campaign for the Aboli-
tion of Torture (CAT) ;3 and, for the first time, has actually begun a major
international campaign against torture in one country-Uruguay. 5
D. United States Catholic Conference
Since World War II, the traditionally conservative Roman Catholic
indirectly gives funds to AI by permitting traffic fines to be paid to either Al or the govern-
ment. See Human Rights NGOs, supra note 15, at _; see also Kernan, Art and Amnesty
for Mutual Benefit, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1976, §E, at 3, col. 1. International art sales to
benefit AI were given in Washington, D.C., New York, Paris, London, Chicago, and Los
Angeles.
Ottaway, The Growing Lobby for Human Rights, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1976, §B, at 5,
col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Ottaway]. Al's budget for fiscal year 1976 was about $800,000
while ICJ's was roughly $200,000. See also Human Rights NGOs, supra note 15, at -.
ILHR's budget for fiscal year 1975 was about $50,000.
" Missions were sent to the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, and El Salvador. THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-76, supra note 2, at 83-116.
52 Id.
'3 Amnesty International, ANNUAL REPORT 1972-73, 23-24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as AI
ANNUAL REPORT 1973]. In 1972, the International Council, concerned about the epidemic
growth of torture by governments, decided to launch a worldwide Campaign for the Abolition
of Torture (CAT). As part of its program to eradicate torture, a system of "urgent action
campaigns" was developed, whereby hundreds of telegrams and letters could be rapidly sent
to offending governments on behalf of torture victims. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1974-75, at 18-25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as AI ANNUAL REPORT 1975].
[T]he concentration of urgent action campaigns has been on certain Latin Ameri-
can countries, especially Chile, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. The large amount
of attention given to these countries is accounted for by a combination of factors.
First, anyone detained there for political reasons is liable to be subjected to torture
during the period immediately following arrest. Second, political persecution in
these countries has continued unabated or, as in Argentina after the March 1976
military coup, has intensified. Finally, AI continues to receive reliable information
about arrests there quickly enough to be able to interevene.
In addition, urgent action campaigns were initiated on behalf of victims in the Dominican
Republic, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Haiti and Paraguay. THE AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-76, supra note 2, at 25.
" Launched on February 19, 1976, with a series of news conferences in major North Ameri-
can and European cities, the campaign had the central theme of the widespread and system-
atic use of torture in a country once known as the "Switzerland of South America." A
worldwide petition was circulated (over 350,000 signatures were collected) calling for an
independent international investigation into allegations of torture. Al addressed the then-
President Bordaberry and other officials informing them of international concern. The Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) was informed, and EEC stated it would deny Uruguay
better trade terms with it. Id. at 27-28.
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Church has become the sole surviving institution that can offer opposition
to the aforementioned ideology of Latin American national security
states.55 The potential influence of the Church becomes increasingly dra-
matic when one understands that 90 percent of all Latin Americans are
baptized Catholics. 6 In the United States the Catholic Conference
(USCC), the administrative arm of the American Catholic Bishops, has
become deeply involved in the human rights struggle.57 Acting through its
office of International Justice and Peace, the Conference's foreign policy
section, USCC maintains close contact with Latin American church groups
promoting human rights. In its work USCC must strike a delicate balance
between two conflicting viewpoints. On the one hand USCC must proclaim
and defend "the sacred dignity of the human person" in accordance with
its evangelical mission.5 On the other hand, it must consider the ideology
of Latin American governments which value the dignity of the individual
"only insofar as it contribute[s] to the so-called security of the national
state." 9
Although USCC is interested in church-related human rights activities
throughout Latin America, it has focused on the violations in Brazil and
Chile. USCC has acted in these countries by exposing and denouncing
violations through its publication services, 0 filing complaints with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and publicly supporting
activist churches in its Statement of Solidarity on Human Rights: Chile
and Brazil.' In this latter statement USCC urged the United States gov-
ernment "to condition its financial and military assistance to Chile upon
the demonstration that human and civil rights have been restored in that
country."6 To facilitate the presentation of such views USCC maintains
an office for government liaison which transmits official Catholic policy
statements to members of Congress. 3 USCC has also expressed its solidar-
ity with the Brazilian Church by endorsing and distributing such state-
-" Lernoux, Latin Church Opposing Authoritarian Regimes, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 1976, §A,
at 8, col. 1; Lernoux, Latin America's Insurgent Church: Priests for the People, NATION, May
22, 1976, at 625 [hereinafter cited as Lernoux, Insurgent Church].
Lernoux, Insurgent Church, supra note 55, at 618.
" Interview with Thomas Quigley, Latin Affairs Advisor, Office of Justice and Peace,
USCC, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Quigley Interview].
" Human Rights in Argentina: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organiza-
tions of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Argentina Hearings].
' Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 30.
S United States Catholic Conference, Statement of Solidarity of Human Rights: Chile and
Brazil (Feb. 14, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Solidarity].
12 Id. at 1.
Quigley Interview, note 57 supra.
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ments as the "Letter of the Brazilian Bishops" which calls for greater
respect for human rights and condemns the national security state. 4
E. National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States
The National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States (NCC)
is a broadly inclusive federation of Protestant and Eastern Orthodox de-
nominations. 5 Established in 1950, NCC's Governing Board directs the
agency's policies and programs through which churches work together to
promote social justice and understanding among people in the United
States and overseas. NCC's Caribbean and Latin America Department is
active in human rights affairs for that continent. NCC involvement is
premised upon one of its avowed purposes "to study and to speak and act
on conditions and issues in the nation and the world which involve moral,
ethical, and spiritual principles inherent in the Christian gospel. '6
This "purpose" has been bolstered by key policy statements which per-
tain to human rights. The first, which was adopted by the NCC General
Assembly on December 6, 1963, broadly outlined the organization's human
rights position. 7 This pronouncement defined certain fundamental human
rights and charged both churches and the nation with responsibility for
promoting them. The second, the NCC Resolution on Human Rights and
United States Foreign Aid,6" reaffirmed the original policy statement by
declaring that "respect for human rights lies at the very heart of our Chris-
tian faith."'" It also criticized the "appalling examples" of governments
which violated human rights and encouraged the American Government
to "suspend further military assistance and economic aid to the govern-
ments" as long as they persist in flagrant abuses.10 Moreover, NCC urged
its constituency "to vote their consciences in this election year by ascer-
taining the specific positions of candidates concerning human rights at
" National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, Pastoral Communication to the People of God
12 (Nov. 16, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Pastoral Communications]. According to that letter,
"the Nation is not synonymous with the State, neither is the State the bestower of liberty
and human rights whose existence precedes the very Nation itself. . . .To place the State,
the government, above the Nation means to overestimate the value of individual security."
In supporting and initiating attacks on the national security state, USCC affirms its funda-
mental belief that peace "can come only with justice in the world." Statement by Administra-
tive Board, U.S. Catholic Conference, Panama-U.S. Relations 4 (Feb. 24, 1975).
11 H. PRATT, THE LIBERALIZATION OF AMmucAN PROTESTANTISM: A CASE STUDY IN COMPLEX
ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRATT].
" NEW CATHouc ENCYCLOPEDIA 235 (1967).
Human Rights: A Policy Statement of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the
United States of America (Dec. 6, 1963).
," Resolution on Human Rights and United States Foreign Aid (Oct. 13, 1974).
" Id. at 1.
70 Id. at 2-3.
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home and abroad." 71
NCC is known for having a pronounced liberal" orientation on both
domestic and foreign issues. Its primary efforts have been directed at edu-
cating both government officials and voters about human rights matters
in hopes of shaping a foreign policy which is sensitive to these abuses. NCC
understands that credibility in the political arena is enhanced by nonpar-
tisanship. Thus, in striving for influence, NCC has attempted to walk the
narrow line between what Latin Americans call la politica (partisan poli-
tics) and lo politico (the political realm); i.e., NCC attempts to operate
subtly in the political realm (lo politico) without standing accused of prac-
ticing partisan politics (la politica).
F. Washington Office on Latin America
The least known of the NGOs herein considered is the Washington Office
on Latin America (WOLA). WOLA is the permanent arm of the Latin
American Strategy Committee (LASC) in Washington, D.C. LASC, a coa-
lition comprised of an ecumenical group of church and academic interests,
has a profound concern for political, economic and social conditions in
Latin America." With a small administrative staff"4 and meager budget,75
WOLA functions as a "brokerage operation" which collects, evaluates and
reports to its constituents matters of importance affecting Latin America.7
WOLA focuses its efforts on educating the United States Congress about
human rights violations by publishing Legislative Update, an ecumenical
newsletter, and developing personal contacts with members of Congress
and their staffs so that it can influence legislation which might affect
human rights policy. Since beginning operation in May 1974, WOLA has
become a significant force on Capitol Hill."
7' Id. at 3.
72 "Liberal" is used in its current American usage as indicating four attitudes: "(1) satisfac-
tion with the economic policies and directions of the modem welfare state and acceptance of
them as given; (2) affirmation of America's world responsibilities and support of international
cooperation; (3) the shunning of ideological or doctrinaire commitment in either economic or
political matters; and (4) belief in the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as embodi-
ments of civil liberties essential to a free society." PRArr, supra note 65, at 13.
11 Letter from Joe Eldridge and Bill Brown, Washington Office on Latin America
[hereinafter cited as WOLA letter].
", Interview with Jo Marie Griesgraber, Washington Office on Latin America, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Dec. 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Griesgraber Interview].
11 WOLA Quarterly Budget (Nov. 29, 1976). The budget for the period from Sept. 21 to
Nov. 30, 1976, was about $4,000. Id.
' WOLA Letter, note 73, supra.
" Griesgraber Interview, note 74, supra.
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IV. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION
A. Discovering and Investigating Human Rights Violations
1. Learning about Violations
Most NGOs rely on similar kinds of sources to acquire initial notification
of human rights violations-relatives of prisoners, missionaries and church
organizations, lawyers, journalists, students, refugees, press reports, doc-
tors, labor unions and opposition groups, anonymous letters and unnamed
travelers.78 These NGOs maintain close contact with their informants to
insure an uninterrupted flow of information. Church-related persons and
organizations have shouldered much of the burden of providing informa-
tion about torture practices, arbitrary arrests, physical attacks and other
violations." While it is difficult to estimate the precise number of inform-
ants, the web of personal contacts is quite extensive; for example, there
are approximately 12,000 Catholic and Protestant missionaries now serv-
ing in Latin America. 0 Aside from personal observations, the NGOs also
rely, inter alia, on international news services such as the London journal,
Latin America, unclassified State Department and CIA publications and
the Third World press.
2. Evaluating Information
While the quantity of information received is voluminous, the quality of
that information is less certain. NGOs recognize that their influence and
prestige depend largely on the accuracy of their information. Therefore,
each has developed a rather elaborate system for verifying the "raw" infor-
mation which it receives. For example, ICJ obtains a number of reports
from lawyers and uses on-the-scene observers to check and cross check its
information."' Anmesty International uses its own network of friends to
perform a similar function and has a substantial staff allocated to corro-
borate the reports which it receives.82 Moreover, the NGOs exchange infor-
mation with one another to insure accuracy,8 and they maintain informal
contact with various State Department officials-including country desk
11 Ottaway, note 50 supra. These classes of informants also tend to be among the classes
of persons who are most often subjected to the human rights violations.
7' Human Rights in Central America Hearings, supra note 8, at 78.
Lernoux, Insurgent Church, supra note 55, at 625.
" Ottaway, note 50 supra.
AI has assigned 17 researchers and 20 assistants to perform this task at its London office.
Id.
, Interview with William L. Wipfler, Director, Caribbean and Latin American Depart-
ment, National Council of Churches in New York City (Dec. 14, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Wipfler Interview]. The sharing of information has increased markedly since 1973, for it was
then that NGOs first recognized that cooperation among themselves could become a major
asset.
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officers-in an attempt to complete the verification process. This analysis
of "raw" information has allowed the NGOs to develop reputations for
relatively high credibility.84
3. Visiting Involved Countries
After reports of violations have been received and evaluated, many of the
NGOs conduct in loco visits to the involved countries. These visits may
be classified as either (1) observer or (2) investigative missions.8
(1) Observer Missions - Both AI" and ICJP7 have sent observers to
trials where the issue of human rights violations is likely to be raised by
the accused. Experience has shown that the presence of these observers
helps to insure a fairer hearing for the accused and to demonstrate interna-
tional concern about these trials.
(2) Investigative Missions - When an individual NGO desires to col-
lect more detailed information regarding the violations mentioned in pre-
liminary reports, it will visit an offending country. For example, AI8 and
ICJP9 have conducted separate visits to Chile, and ILHR has sent repre-
sentatives to Paraguay1 ° Sometimes two or more NGOs will conduct a
joint visitation, such as AI and ICJ's mission to Uruguay.9 Occasionally
an NGO will be asked to participate in an investigation being conducted
by a third party. For instance, a WOLA representative accompanied sev-
eral Congressmen on a fact finding trip to Chile."2 During these investiga-
tive missions NGO personnel confer with leaders of the accused govern-
ment, members of the local bar associations, prisoners, and other parties
who have information to contribute to their study. 3
B. Dissemination of Information
After substantiating the existence of a violation, the NGO begins the
process of dissemination of information. This process may take two
forms-direct and/or indirect intervention.
4 To be sure, high credibility is not uniform among the various NGOs. Al, ICJ, and ILHR
are recognized for providing especially reliable information. See Ottaway, supra note 50. The
Department of State has been critical of some of the NGO information. See Human Rights
in Central America Hearings, supra note 8, at 213. Furthermore, since some of the NGOs are
more "activist," their work is often of uneven quality. See Weissbrodt, supra note 40, at 300.
Amnesty International, RepoiR ON ToRTRE 77 (1975).
U Al Annual Report 1975, supra note 53, at 143.
97 ICJ Annual Report 1976, supra note 29, at 9.
" International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 531; Chile Hear-
ings, Pt. I, supra note 32, at 3.
" Chile Hearings, Pt. I, supra note 32, at 52; Chile Hearings, Pt. II, supra note 34, at 3.
" ILHR, HuMAN RIGHTS BuLuErN, supra note 22, at 2.
, AI-ICJ URUGUAY MISSION, note 34 supra.
n Griesgraber Interview, note 74 supra.
' International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 533.
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1. Direct Intervention
Direct intervention consists of the NGO, either through its officials or
constituents, directly apprising government officials of the human rights
violations. Once it is decided that such intervention is warranted," nor-
mally a high-level NGO official contacts a high-level government official
and suggests corrective action. However, at least one NGO, AI, employs
its constituents to inform government officials of violations. AI's Interna-
tional Secretariat assigns each "adoption group" three "Prisoners of Con-
science," i.e., persons imprisoned because of their political, religious or
other conscientiously held beliefs, or by reason of their ethnic origin, color,
or language, but who have neither used nor advocated violence. 5 To assure
impartiality the three prisoners are balanced politically and geographi-
cally; one may be from a Communist nation, another from a Western
industrialized country, the third from a developing Third World society.
The "adoption group" then writes personal letters to government officials
seeking to obtain the release of the prisoners. 7 Use of the "adoption group"
method may give AI "a rather amateurish image," but it also instills a
sense of personal responsibility in its increasing number of constituents
and, in the long run, may be more effective than the more professional and
discreet efforts of the high-level NGO official."
Whichever of these methods it utilizes, the NGO which intervenes di-
rectly functions as "a much needed intermediary" between human rights
victims and government authorities. 9 Once aware of the violation and its
attendant risk of embarrassment, the government official may try to amel-
" Weissbrodt, supra note 40, at 300. To determine whether it would be useful to intervene
in a particular situation, Professor Weissbrodt suggests the NGO may ask the following
questions:
Might intervention help or hurt the victim? What sort of intervention would be
most effective? Have interventions with this country or with respect to this type of
problem been successful in the past? Are the personnel of the country receptive to
initiatives from outsiders? Are the facts sufficiently well established to permit
diplomatic intervention or publicity? What NGO would be most effective in raising
the issue?
Id. at 301; see also Ottaway, note 50 supra.
" AI HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 3; see also Al Statute, supra note 41, §1, para. a.
" AI HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 2.
', Perserverance Frees Prisoner - How AI Group Works, MATCHBOX 13 (Fall 1976). For
three years a San Francisco "adoption group" wrote letters to Chilean authorities, flew to
Chile and even telephoned General Pinochet person-to-person in order to obtain the release
of the Chilean administrator of economic affairs in the Allende cabinet and his family. After
his release the group assisted him by providing financial assistance and finding him employ-
ment.
11 Weissbrodt, supra note 40, at 318. Personal involvement by members may account for
AI's growing constituency. See also Human Rights NGOs, supra note 15, at
" Weissbrodt, supra note 40, at 302.
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iorate the situation. '0 If no satisfactory results are obtained within a rea-
sonable time, the NGO may then turn to more indirect forms in order to
disseminate its information.
2. Indirect Intervention
In addition to direct intervention the NGO may indirectly intervene by
seeking to mobilize public opinion against human rights violators on the
theory that "there is no government, however authoritarian, which is not
susceptible in some degree to the force of public opinion."'' Publicity is a
most important element in the mobilization of this opinion. One form of
publicity utilized is the NGO publication, through which invaluable first-
hand information on human rights violations can be provided. 02 The press
release is also employed by the NGO but usually only in serious or urgent
circumstances and with great care in order to insure a good press and
maximum effectiveness. 0 Sometimes, however, the press releases are used
more frequently, especially within the framework of worldwide campaigns
against a particular type of violation, such as AI's Campaign for the Aboli-
tion of Torture, or against one particular country, as in Al's international
campaign against torture in Uruguay."' A third form of publicity is the use
of public meetings and seminars.'"5 Public news media also use NGO-
generated material for feature articles. For instance, TIME magazine's re-
cent story on torture was derived largely from Ars Report on Torture.' °
This publicity is directed primarily to what have been called the "public
and private elites."'0 7 The public elites include those governmental and
intergovernmental authorities who can affect both the short-term and
long-range human rights environment. Private elites consist of groups such
as lawyers, doctors, union leaders, or news media. Because of limited fi-
nancing, NGOs must set priorities between these two elites. The primary
targets of the NGOs are the public elites since they can change national
and international human rights policy.0 8 The private elites become impor-
100 Id.
"' International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 3.
'" Weissbrodt, supra note 40, at 304-06. These publications include, but are not limited
to, the following: WOLA's LEGtsLATrvE UPDATE, ICJ's REvIEW, Al's AMNESTY AcrIoN and
MATCHBOX, ILHR's HumAN RIGHTS BULLETIN.
" Human Rights NGOs, supra note 15, at _; see Griesgraber Interview,, note 34 supra;
see, e.g., Chile Junta Said Continuing Abuse of Human Rights, Wash. Post, § A, at 26,
col. 3, Sept. 3, 1976 (ICJ press release regarding Chile's expulsion of 2 Chilean lawyers, who
openly criticized the junta in an open letter to OAS Assembly in Santiago in June 1976).
04 AMNESTY INTEMATIONAL RERoT 1975-76, supra note 2, at 48.
" Al, ICJ and WOLA sometimes employ this publicity technique.
'" Al letter to the authors (undated).
"0 Wiseberg and Scoble, supra note 39, at 18.
* i Id. at 21.
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tant to the NGO mainly insofar as they influence the public elites.'0 9 Thus,
in order to promote human rights in Latin America, NGOs focus primarily
on the following public elites: the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, the United States Congress and the United States Department of
State."0
V. THE PUBLIC ELITES
A. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The origins of the inter-American system for the protection of human
rights may be traced to the Ninth International Conference of the Ameri-
can States held in Bogota, Colombia in 1948."' At this conference dele-
gates created the Organization of American States (OAS)"2 and adopted
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man"3 which codifies
various essential human rights. These "essential rights of man are not
derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based
upon attributes of his human personality,""' a crucial point also discussed
in the "Letter of the Brazilian Bishops."'' The introduction to the Ameri-
can Declaration continued by stating that "[t]he international protection
of the rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving American
law.""' Despite this strong language the institutional framework to ad-
vance these rights was not established for more than a decade. Finally in
1960, in order to implement the provisions of the American Declaration,
the OAS created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR)." 7 For the past seventeen years NGOs have made IACHR a pri-
mary focal point for their activities in the field of Latin American human
rights.
Human rights has never been a comfortable issue at the OAS."" One
commentator has even gone so far as to describe IACHR as "a self -
induced, benign boil on the body politic of the OAS."" 9 To a degree this
is true because OAS diplomats are disinclined to see member nations
singled out for their abuses since they know that their own government
10" Id.
.1 Although the United Nations is also concerned with human rights in Latin America, its
activities are beyond the scope of this note.
" T. BUERGENTHAL & J. TORNEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
EDUCATION 71-72 (1976) [hereinafter cited as BUERGENTHAL & TORNEY].
11 IACHR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 5.
,, Reprinted in id. at 15 [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN DECLARATION].
"' Id..
11 Pastoral Communication, note 64 supra.
11 American Declaration, note 113 supra.
,, IACHR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 9.
Diuguid, Too Late, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1976, Potomac § (Magazine), at 69.
"' Id. at 60.
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may be the next to stand accused. 0 Notwithstanding the difficulties asso-
ciated with such a role, IACHR was given the function of promoting re-
spect for human rights."' In performing this function IACHR has at-
tempted to exploit the discrepancy between the ideals embodied in the
constitutions and laws of American states and the actual conditions found
in these nations.'2 2
Originally, IACHR'12 was little more than an organ charged with prepar-
ing studies and promotional materials.'2 4 However, in the following years
IACHR's powers were expanded to permit it to investigate charges of
human rights violations by the various American states. '5 Its express pow-
ers and procedures, which are set forth in its Statute'2 and Regulations,'1
have been thoroughly examined in human rights literature.'2 8 Unfortun-
ately these directives are more often breached than honored. Therefore, the
remainder of this section will analyze problems encountered by NGOs as
they interact with IACHR to effectuate progress in the human rights field.
Although neither IACHR's Statute nor Regulations are explicit as to who
may file complaints, it can be inferred that NGOs may do so.' 2' An NGO
may present its evidence of abuses to IACHR in two ways. The most
frequently used method is the filing of a written complaint pursuant to
IACHR's "Model Communications."' 30 Additionally, an NGO may send
121 Id. at 62.
"I Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 1, OAS OFF. REc.,
OEA/Ser. L/VII.26, Doc. 10 (Nov. 2, 1971), reprinted in IACHR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at
23 [hereinafter cited as Statute].
2 A. SCHREIBER, THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 157 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as SCHREIBER].
'2 IACHR is composed of seven members who serve in their private capacities. It meets
for a maximum of 8 weeks each year. IACHR is supported by a small Secretariat consisting
of the Executive Secretary and technical and administrative personnel. The Secretariat is
located in modest rented offices a few blocks away from the main OAS building in Washing-
ton, D.C. See Statute, supra note 121, arts. 3, 4, 11; G. DA FONSECA, How TO FILE COMPLAINTS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A PRAcTICAL GUIDE TO INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PROCEDURES 113
(1975) [hereinafter cited as DA FONSECA; Diuguid, note 118 supra.
"4 BUERGENTHAL & TORNEY, supra note 111, at 73.
" Statute, supra note 121, art. 9 bis.
12 Statute, note 121 supra.
117 Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/H.17,
Doc. 26 (May 2, 1967), reprinted in IACHR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 29 [hereinafter cited
as Regulations].
' See generally BUERGENTHAL & TORNEY, note 111 supra; SCHREIBER, note 122 supra; Buer-
genthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L.
828 (1975).
"' DA FONSECA, supra note 123, at 109.
Model Communication, reprinted in IACHR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 42-43. During
the past year Al submitted complaints regarding violations in Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay
and Uruguay. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-76, supra note 2, at 45-46. ICJ has sub-
mitted reports on Chile and Argentina. ICJ ANNUAL REPORT 1976, supra note 29, at 12.
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representatives to appear personally before IACHR.'3' Personal appear-
ances are discouraged, however, because they tend to unduly increase the
IACHR's heavy workload.
Once an NGO has filed a complaint it encounters difficulties with
IACHR's operating procedures. One problem involves the requirement of
exhaustion of internal remedies.' This requirement is based on the fact
that protection of the human rights of people within each nation is one of
the basic duties of the government concerned. Thus, organs of interna-
tional protection, such as IACHR, are technically precluded from taking
action until after the offending government has failed to discharge that
duty . 3 This requirement is difficult for most NGOs to satisfy since they
usually submit complaints cataloging multiple violations. Often the NGO
which sends a complaint does not have the means to obtain specific infor-
mation regarding the exhaustion of internal remedies by each individual
mentioned in that communication. Moreover, even if the NGO possessed
the means to verify exhaustion of remedies, the process would be too taxing
on the limited resources of the NGO. In hopes of alleviating some of the
difficulties attendant to the submission of multiple violation complaints,
IACHR has developed an unwritten "general case" procedure. Pursuant to
this procedure NGOs may submit complaints of multiple violations in the
ordinary manner, but they do not have to verify first the exhaustion of
remedies by each named victim. IACHR is to be commended for creating
such an innovative solution to such a difficult problem; however, the avail-
ability of this procedure is not yet well known among the NGOs which
frequently submit complaints. For this reason it is recommended that this
procedure be codified in IACHR's Statute. Knowledge of this new method
will no doubt increase the NGO's respect for IACHR because, historically,
some complainants have become very frustrated by IACHR's complex pro-
cedures.
A second procedural matter which has confused certain NGOs is the
meaning of "consultative status." In some intergovernmental organiza-
tions the granting of "consultative status" carries great weight. Such sta-
tus may allow the designated NGO the right of petition and/or the right
to have its observers present at debates. 34 However, "consultative status"
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: WHAT IT IS AND How IT FUNCTIONS
6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as IACHR PAMPHLEr]. ILHR has appeared to request an immedi-
ate investigation of Paraguay's treatment of the Ache Indians. INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR THE
RIGHTS OF MAN ANNUAL REvIEw 1974-75, supra note 16, at 25. WOLA and USCC also have
met with the entire IACHR or with its members individually. Griesgraber Interview, note 74
supra; Quigley Interview, note 57 supra.
32 Statute, supra note 121, art. 9 bis.
13 IACHR PAMPHLET, supra note 131, 5.
See generally Prasad, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the New United
Nations Procedures of Human Rights Complaints, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 441 (1975).
Confusion has resulted from Al's claim to have such status before IACHR.
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carries no weight before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. Anyone may submit a complaint so long as it conforms to the basic
requirements set forth in IACHR's Regulations.'3 5 All complaints are pro-
cessed in the order in which they are received. In this way IACHR clearly
demonstrates that it places no premium on "consultative status," or for
that matter, on the likelihood that an NGO complaint will be profession-
ally drafted or more apt to be kept active through follow-up procedures.
While this procedure assures essential fairness to the individual complain-
ant, it tends to stymie NGO efforts to bring incidents of group or societal
violations to the attention of IACHR. Therefore, IACHR should formulate
a dual procedure for evaluation of complaints. That is, it should establish,
on the one hand, priority ranking of complaints from individuals, and on
the other hand, a separate priority order for communications received from
NGOs. Utilizing this dual procedure, IACHR could marshal some of its
resources toward achieving the greatest good for large groups without neg-
lecting the complaints of individual victims.
In addition to these procedural problems, NGOs are now quite con-
cerned about IACHR's future course of action, especially in light of recent
personnel changes. In 1976, three commissioners announced that they
would not seek re-election.'36 Furthermore, Dr. Luis Reque, the Executive
Secretary, resigned, charging that certain OAS members wished to impede
IACHR from effectively protecting human rights.'37 Dr. Reque was re-
placed by a Peruvian jurist, Dr. Emilio Castafion Pasquel;'1 however
within a short time, he also resigned. NGOs are already becoming uneasy
over these developments, and at least one NGO, AL, has voiced a fear that
these events may jeopardize the serious and courageous work of IACHR. 3
Unfortunately this turmoil comes just when IACHR is achieving signifi-
cant progress. This progress was most evident during the Sixth Regular
Session of the OAS General Assembly at Santiago, Chile, in June 1976.
This was the first occasion when IACHR's reports were openly discussed
by an OAS General Assembly and "not merely noted and filed away."'' 0
In addition, as the result of then Secretary of State Kissinger's address,
IACHR was given hopes of an enlarged budget and staff.'' With a larger
' Regulations, supra note 127, art. 38.
'3 THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-76, supra note 2, at 47.
' Id. The actual reasons for Reque's resignation are as yet unclear. These may include his
alienation of the Chilean delegation or perhaps questions about his moral conduct. Diuguid,
supra note 118, at 14, 70; also, one source reported that he was influenced by threats by
certain governments to kidnap his daughter. International Commission of Jurists, 16 THE
REvIEw 24 (1976).
'I OAS Hearing, supra note 1, at 15.
In THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-76, supra note 2, at 46.
"' OAS Hearing, supra note 1, at 3.
"4 Id. at 18-21. The United States has pledged $102,000 to assist IACHR. Id. at 28. The
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budget and staff, IACHR could deal more competently with human rights
violations. From the NGO point of view such growth is desirable. IACHR,
because of its status as an intergovernmental organ of the OAS, is immune
from charges that its findings are propaganda.' Consequently, Latin
American governments probably respect IACHR more than any of the
NGOs herein considered. By acting in concert with a more competent
IACHR, NGOs could more effectively mobilize domestic and international
public opinion against governments which persistently abuse internation-
ally recognized human rights.
NGOs, sensing the need for close cooperation with IACHR, have made
significant contributions. First, NGO complaints are of great informa-
tional value to IACHR. Second, the publicity which often results after the
submission of these complaints has become an effective sanction against
human rights violators.4 3 Third, the efforts of the NGOs have culminated
in IACHR's extension of hope-albeit possibly false hope-to many of
Latin America's downtrodden people. Even false hopes of improvement in
the human rights situation are preferable to desperation in such deplorable
circumstances.
But the extension of hope, alone, is not enough. Both IACHR and its
NGO supporters must work closely together to increase the level of real
progress in this area. The IACHR-NGO relationship, however, has not
always been a cordial one. Some NGOs have tended to become frustrated
with IACHR's complex procedures and its lack of tangible results. These
NGOs criticize it for its cautious approach to serious matters. While
IACHR is sensitive to this criticism, it is dependent upon the constituent
members of the OAS for political support. Therefore, it contends that its
policy of methodical progress, marked by incremental gains, is the best
way to improve the human rights climate in Latin America, or as one
informed source confided, "the object is not to take a step backward."
Perhaps this goal is myopic in the face of societal abuses of human
rights. Therefore, in order for IACHR and its supporting NGOs to solidify
past gains and set new goals for the future, they should convene a planning
conference to discuss an agenda of mutual interest. The benefits which
recommendation to enlarge IACHR's staff and budget was initially made by Thomas Quigley
of USCC during congressional hearings held in 1973. International Protection of Human
Rights Hearings, supra, note 20, at 207. The Linowitz Commission has also made the recom-
mendation that "[tihe U.S. Government should support moves to strengthen the independ-
ence, access, and staff capacity of regional mechanisms for monitoring human rights, espe-
cially of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and also of the United Nations
and non-governmental organizations involved in monitoring human rights violations." Com-
mission on United States-Latin American Relations, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA:
NEXT STEPS 8 (Dec. 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as NEXT STEPS].
"I BUERGENTrAL & TORNEY, supra note 111, at 75.
",3 DA FONSECA, supra note 123, at 119.
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could be derived are so substantial that this meeting would be most worth-
while. Unless such an assembly is held in the near future, it is conceivable
that some of the frustrated NGOs may increase their level of operations
in other arenas, thereby relegating IACHR to an inferior position in the
struggle for Latin American human rights.
B. United States Congress
Prior to 1973 NGOs considered the United States Congress to be apa-
thetic toward international human rights.'' Since then, however, a more
cooperative relationship with Congress has developed.'" Today, with the
Carter Aministration's emphasis on human rights, there is much human
rights activity in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.'"
One reason for this change in congressional attitude is the commitment
to human rights of congressional staff aides, who play an important role
in organizing congressional hearings. Their experience with the Vietnam
War, the Peace Corps, the civil rights movement, or NGOs has made many
staff aides more committed to human rights issues than the legislators."'
This commitment by staff aides, together with a general dissatisfaction
with both United States and international response to human rights viola-
tions, gave impetus to a series of hearings by one of the most active sub-
committees on human rights, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
International Organizations. ' One of the main objectives of these hear-
ings, chaired by Representative Donald M. Fraser, D-Minnesota, is to
"improve the capacity of international organizations to effectively protect
internationally recognized standards of human rights." ' To achieve this
improved "capacity of international organizations" the Fraser Subcom-
mittee held hearings during the 94th Congress-17 of which focused on
Latin America. 50
"' International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 411 (statement
of Jerome Shestack, ILHR Chairman).
"I NGOs have also developed influential relationships with other parliaments. For exam-
ple, the Venzuelan Senate and the European Economic Community (EEC) Parliament pub-
licly condemned the human rights violations in Uruguay as a result of Al's campaign against
torture in that country. Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, at 41.
"' See Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 231 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Weissbrodt, Human Rights].
"I For the Record: The Human Rights Lobby in the U S.A., 10 LATIN AMERICA 315 (1976);
compare 15 Y.B. INT'L ORGANIZATONS, supra note 26, at 284 with International Protection of
Human Rights Hearings, supra note 19, at ii.
"I International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 19, at ix. The name of
the committee today is House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organ-
izations.
122 CoNG. REc. E5440 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Fraser).
Id. During the 94th Congress the following number of hearings were held: Uruguay, 3;
Chile, 2; Argentina, 2; Paraguay, 2; El Salvador, 2; Nicaragua, 2; Guatemala, 2; Cuba, 1;
Haiti, 1.
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How have NGOs contributed to this congressional concern for human
rights in Latin America? NGOs have primarily provided congressional
staff aides with information otherwise difficult to acquire and have partici-
pated in congressional hearings. In choosing a country to focus on for
organizing a hearing, staff aides use NGO information. To facilitate this
congressional use of information, some NGOs foster personal contact with
staff aides as well as provide them with information through their publica-
tions. 15' During a hearing, NGOs provide congressmen with a competent
briefing system, by furnishing their officials, scholars, and other witnesses,
including citizens and refugees, with reports of human rights violations in
the country.'52
What has been the effect of this NGO effort in Congress? NGOs have
engaged in a process which has raised government's consciousness about
human rights violations. 3 When NGOs brief congressmen during a hear-
ing, opposing witnesses may present conflicting evidence. 5 During the
course of the hearings, however, NGO allegations are usually corrobor-
ated.5 5 This process of corroboration in a hearing has increased NGO credi-
bility and consequently has enhanced NGO legitimacy. 15 Thus, what
NGOs say has gained increasing weight with those in the United States
government. 57
"I Both WOLA, see text at note 77, and USCC, see text at note 63, maintain congressional
liaison and have offices in Washington, D.C. Al also has a Washington, D.C. office, but its
primary purpose is to act as a liaison between its International Secretariat and the Depart-
ment of State, IACHR, and the World Bank, and to monitor events in Washington. ILHR
and ICJ do not presently have Washington offices so they, like AI, rely on providing informa-
tion through their publications rather than personal contact.
'5' USCC officials presented reports on Brazil and Argentina: International Protection of
Human Rights Hearings, supra, note 20, at 188-217; Brazil Hearings, note 12 supra; Argentina
Hearings, supra note 57, at 25-31, 39-43. ILHR representatives submitted a report on Para-
guay, Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, at 76-108, 161-218. Al and ICJ repre-
sentatives gave reports on Uruguay and Chile id. at 39-74; Chile Hearings, Pt. I supra note
32, at 3-33, 52-92, 64-138; Chile Hearings, Pt. II, supra note 34, at 3-16, 33-64; International
Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 531-56. An NCC official, using AI's
research, submitted a statement on Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, Human Rights
in Central America Hearings, supra note 8, at 78-88. WOLA provided the following witnesses:
a Nicaraguan philosophy professor, an exiled president of the National University of El
Salvador, and a Guatemalan politician. Id. at 10, 31, 50, 210-11.
l5 International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 29.
4 See, e.g., Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, at 109-14 (statement of Hon.
Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State).
5 Congress evidently believed AI's report of violations in Uruguay since it cut off military
assistance to that country. See note 163 infra.
"' See, e.g., Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, at 117; Weissbrodt, Human
Rights, supra note 146, at 239 n.29, 244 n.48.
"I An example of this raised consciousness about human rights is demonstrated by the
September 3, 1976, statement signed by 102 incumbent Senators and Representatives and
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Because of this heightened consciousness Congress has enacted human
rights legislation. Two human rights amendments were added to the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 - section 116, which prohibits economic aid
to countries committing gross violations of human rights unless such aid
is directly beneficial to needy people,'58 and section 502B which recom-
mends denial of military assistance to countries committing gross viola-
tions of human rights unless there are extraordinary circumstances requir-
ing that assistance.'59 Another statute conditions United States financial
or technical assistance through the Inter-American Bank upon similar
human rights provisions.'8 0 As a result of this legislation, economic aid to
Chile was restricted, 6 ' military aid to Chile' and Uruguay' was termi-
nated, and an Inter-American Development Bank loan to Chile was
blocked by the United States.'
NGO efforts in the Congress have also facilitated the extraction of infor-
mation from a sometimes secretive Department of State. Information is
obtained either informally, through an exchange of letters between Con-
gress and the Department, or formally through the mandatory annual
reports or requested statements which the Department must submit to
Congress as a result of section 502B.115 The letters usually serve to extract
information unknown at the hearing or clarify conflicting statements. 6
28 candidates in the November election urging all candidates for public office to support the
idea of making human rights a priority of American foreign policy. This statement was
drafted with the acknowledged help of Al. Ottaway, supra note 50, at § B at 5, col. 4.
" 22 U.S.C.A. §2151n(a) (Pamph. Supp. 1, 1976).
's' 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304 (Pamph. Supp. III, Pt. 1, 1976).
'8 22 U.S.C. 28 3y (Supp. 1976).
"' International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, §320,
89 Stat. 868. Testimony by NCC was given which suggested that the Department of State
and the Agency for International Development (AID) may? have exceeded the Congressional
restriction on economic aid in §320. See Chile: The Status of Human Rights and its Relation-
ship to US. Economic Assistance Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976)
(statement of Leonard C. Meeker, Staff Attorney, Center for Law and Social Policy on Behalf
of the National Council of Churches Committee on the Caribbean and Latin America).
" International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
329, §406, 90 Stat. 758.
"I Uruguay's Military Leaders Angry Over Congressional Cutoff on Aid for Arms, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 5, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
" Diuguid, U.S. Vote on Chile Loan Stirs Question, Wash. Post, July 9, 1976, at §A, at 2,
col. 1. Citing IACHR Report on Chile as evidence of a consistent pattern of gross violations,
the United States cast the only no vote against Chile's loan and was thus chastised by some
Latin American nations for imposing political criteria on loans. However, although the United
States might be instructed to vote against a loan, the loan still might be approved; the United
States does not have veto power in the Inter-American Development Bank.
" 22 U.S.C.A. §2304(b),(c).
" See, e.g., International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 812-14;
Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, 143-44.
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The reports submitted under section 502B provide pertinent information
regarding human rights conditions in countries receiving aid. Although the
Department recently submitted reports on Argentina, Haiti and Peru on
a classified basis in order to avoid diplomatic complications, the House
Committee on International Relations insisted that much of the reports be
made public." 7
That NGO efforts in Congress have had an effect cannot be doubted;
however, it is difficult to measure their success. Often the position of the
United States concerning human rights is inconsistent; therefore, the mes-
sage which a Latin American country receives is unclear. For example,
even though Congress restricted economic assistance to Chile, cut off mili-
tary aid, and influenced the United States vote against Chile's Inter-
American Development Bank loan, the United States recently supported
two World Bank development loans to Chile totaling $60 million.," How-
ever, even if the United States position on human rights were consistent,
such consistency might be regarded by Latin American governments as
interference with their internal affairs and could cause the reduction of
American influence in that area. For instance, recent official American
criticism of the way five Latin American countries treated their citizens
caused those nations to reject United States mititary aid altogether.'
Despite this difficulty of measuring effectiveness, the authors consider
it important that NGOs continue to foster personal contact with congres-
sional aides and retain credibility with congressional committees in order
to broaden the impact they have already made. By the same token, Con-
gress must continue to encourage NGOs to provide up-to-date evaluations
of human rights conditions in Latin America and strive to utilize this
information in the formulation of United States foreign policy. 7" In addi-
tion, the authors recommend that the NGOs work with Congress to alle-
viate their lack of financing. The Fraser Subcommitte has already recom-
mended that the Department of State continue funding human rights
'7 Human Rights and U.S. Policy: Argentina, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Peru, and the Phillip-
pines, Reports Submitted to the House Comm. on International Relations by the Department
of State, iii, v (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 State Department Report].
"' What's News-World-Wide, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1976, at 1, col. 3. Five European coun-
tries opposed the loans because of Chile's record on human rights but the United States voted
for both.
"' What's News-World-Wide, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 3. Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay, El Salvador, and Guatemala have rejected United States aid.
"' The authors endorse this recent recommendation of the Linowitz Commission:
In making its own determination of whether a government has been engaged in
gross and systematic human rights violations, the United States should take into
consideration reports from. . . the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
and such private institutions as the . . . International Commission of Jurists and
Amnesty International.
NEXT STEPs, supra note 141, at 8-9.
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NGOs.' 7' Most NGOs, however, would prefer another source of financing
since there is always the danger they may become dependent upon govern-
ment funding and compromise their political independence."' Such fund-
ing may also be viewed as implementation of United States policy by Latin
American governments, which would throw doubt upon the political im-
partiality of NGOs. Latin American skepticism of either NGO political
independence or impartiality would impair NGO effectiveness as advo-
cates for the protection of human rights. A more imaginative solution is
needed so that NGO financing would be unconnected with United States
policy. For example, in the Federal Republic of Germany traffic violators
can pay their fines either to the government or to AI."3 Although such
funds are funneled through the government, they reach the NGO as the
result of individual choice and thus avoid being labelled as the implemen-
tation of government policy. These apparently contradictory recommenda-
tions underscore the complexity of the NGOs' task. On the one hand,
NGOs must try to form close personal contact with congressmen and staff
aides so that they can educate Congress and thereby influence the role of
human rights in United States foreign policy. On the other hand, if the
NGOs are associated too closely with the United States government their
independence and impartiality may be impaired to the extent that they
become ineffective in dealing with Latin American governments.
C. United States Department of State
Prior to the Fraser Subcommittee hearings, an NGO could report viola-
tions to the Office of Legal Adviser or the Bureau of International Organi-
zation Affairs.'14 These understaffed bureaus within the Department of
State were the only two with specific responsibilities for human rights.'"
In addition, no specific procedure existed for considering the impact of
human rights on policy decisions.'76 During the Fraser Subcommittee hear-
ings both AP'" and ILHR'75 recommended the establishment of a bureau
1 Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership, Report of the
Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights in the World
Community Report]. The only NGO which the authors found receiving funds from the
Department of State or Agency for International Development was ICJ. See International
Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 814.
"I Id., accord, International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 394-
95.
, Human Rights NGOs, supra note 15, at -.
,7, International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 95, 506.
,7 Human Rights in the World Community Report, supra note 171, at 12.
, International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 817.
" Id. at 258.
'7 Id. at 401.
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in the Department for human rights affairs - a recommendation which
the Department opposed because it considered the existing structure ade-
quate.7 9
As a result of these hearings, legislation was introduced 0 and eventually
enacted, establishing the Office of Coordinator for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs. 8 ' This office must monitor human rights practices
worldwide,8 " annually submit reports to Congress on over 80 countries
receiving security assistance,' 3 transmit congressionally requested state-
ments on the human rights situation in selected countries within thirty
days,' 4 and advise the Secretary of State and the Agency for International
Development on human rights issues.'8 In order to adequately accomplish
these legislative responsibilities, the "badly understaffed" Coordinator has
requested additional personnel.8 8 Besides the Coordinator, the Depart-
ment on its own initiative'7 has assigned at least one officer in each geo-
graphic and functional bureau to insure that human rights are given suffi-
cient attention in the decision making process.' s8 Thus, although it may be
too early to assess the effectiveness of this new human rights structure,
NGOs at least have broader opportunities to report violations to the De-
partment.
The Department of State has characterized its relationship with NGOs
as cooperative and open.' To an extent this characterization is correct.
Some Department officials have cooperated informally with NGOs in the
promotion of human rights."' During the Brazil Hearings, USCC publicly
"T' Id. at 817; contra, Human Rights in the World Community Report, supra note 171, at
12.
,1 International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 594.
" International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
329, 90 Stat. 748, §§301(b), 624(f)(1).
392 Id. §624(f)(2).
1 Id.
lId. §§301(a), 502B(c)(1).
"Id. §§301(b), 624(f)(2)(c).
'" Additional Human Rights Positions (unpublished xerox of internal Department of State
memo, undated). Two extra officers were requested. One would supervise the monitoring of
present statutory requirements. The other would develop positive human rights programs
such as exchanges between law schools.
" International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 95.
Im Interview with Moncrieff J. Spear, Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Dec. 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Spear Interview]. In the following geographic
bureaus there is at least one human rights officer: Europe, East Asia, American Republics,
Near East, Africa. In the following functional bureaus there is at least one human rights
officer: Political-Military Affairs, Congressional Relations, Legal Adviser, International Or-
ganizations, Policy Planning. In addition, there are human rights officers in AID.
"[1975] DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 225 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 DIGEST].
10 Weissbrodt, Human Rights, supra note 146, at 264 n. 111.
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acknowledged the cooperation of the present Assistant Legal Adviser for
Human Rights.'"' WOLA also attests to a regular exchange and verification
of information with certain Department officials.' In addition, Depart-
ment of State representatives attend public NGO meetings,' 3 subscribe to
NGO publications,"' and seek to follow up allegations of human rights
abuses through NGOs.9 5 Both Department and NGO officials acknowledge
that NGOs usually receive information of human rights abuses before the
Department does. 99 Thus, on the one hand, Department officials assist
NGOs in verifying charges of violations. On the other hand, NGOs provide
Department officials with accurate, though at times uneven, information.
In other areas, however, the State Department-NGO relationship is not
as cooperative or as open as it could be. Tension exists between the Depart-
ment and NGOs due to differences in goals and approaches to human
rights problems. Both the Department and NGOs acknowledge the inter-
national legal responsibility to protect human rights worldwide," 7 not just
within one's domestic jurisdiction.' 9 However, the fundamental goal of the
Department is to "promote peace and the security and welfare of the
United States and its citizens,"'9 9 while the basic objective of NGOs is to
promote the observance of human rights. Consequently, when incorporat-
ing human rights into foreign policy, the Department must not only con-
sider what can be accomplished in the promotion and observance of basic
human rights in other countries, but must also take into account the costs
to the complicated web of United States economic, political and security
interests.2 0 The Department cannot ignore the "reality" that most coun-
tries in Latin America regard queries about human rights violations as
unwarranted interference in domestic affairs and as politically un-
friendly.29 ' NGOs can ignore this "reality" since they are usually indepen-
dent of political forces and thus are freer to identify and criticize human
rights violations through the use of adverse international publicity. 202 The
"' Brazil Hearing, supra note 12, at 19.
192 Griesgraber Interview, note 74 supra.
" Id.
" During interviews with Department of State personnel, copies of ICJ and Al annual and
special reports were observed.
. Human Rights in Central America Hearings, supra note 8, at 210-11. The Department
of State used information from Al and ICJ when submitting 1976 State Department Report;
see, e.g., 1976 State Department Report at 2, 8, 21, 24, 30.
" Wipfler Interview, note 83 supra.
[1974] DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRAcTIcE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 [hereinafter cited
as 1974 DIGEST].
I9 d. See International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 95.
" 1974 DIGEST, supra note 197, at 123.
International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 201.
"I Id. at 95.
" Weissbrodt, supra note 40, at 297-300.
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Department, however, would prefer to use "quiet but forceful diplo-
macy ' 03 in order to avoid diplomatic complications.
NGOs recognize the Department's conflict between interests of national
security and a declared policy of promoting respect for human rights. °1
They feel, however, that sometimes this conflict may be confused with a
conflict between long- and short-term interests, since a government which
consistently violates human rights may in the long run be an ally of doubt-
ful value. 205 Such governments may be less permanent than they appear,
and eventually those Latin Americans whom the United States helped to
suppress may become the future' leaders of new governments.20 Also, in
opposition to the Department's contention that unilateral United States
action might be regarded as intervention, NGOs argue that active support
of military regimes in those countries is also a form of United States inter-
vention.20 7 Because of these conflicts NGOs many times advocate a policy
contrary to that of the Department. For instance, NGO officials view sec-
tions 116208 and 502B" as flexible legislation which will make "quiet diplo-
macy" more effective since the offending government will know that if
"quiet diplomacy" fails, a decrease in United States economic or military
aid may follow. 210 Many Department of State officials, however, complain
that the legislative standard for cutting off such aid - "consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights' 2 1' - is un-
workable and warn that reducing economic or military aid to offending
nations may restrict the United States options to deal with human rights
problems in those countries.2 12
The State Department-NGO relationship is also not as open as it should
be. For example, several NGOs were unaware that there were at least two
Department officials on the Policy-Planning Staff with responsibility for
emphasizing human rights issues in policy decisions . 2 1 Also, many NGOs
were ignorant of the existence of the Open Forum Panel, an in-house chan-
nel for new or dissenting views on United States foreign policy designed to
bring such views directly to the Secretary of State.2 1 1 Since its inception
the Open Forum Panel has become institutionalized with its own classified
1975 DIGEST, supra note 189, at 226.
201 United States Policy and Human Rights, 14 Rzv. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS 25 (1975).
m2 Id.
2N Weissbrodt Human Rights, supra note 146, at 253 n.77.
21 Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, at 8, 13.
2" See note 158 supra.
10 See note 159 supra.
"I International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 211.
2 Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, at 116.
2 1975 DIGEST, note 189 supra.
2"3 See note 188 supra.
211 S. VOGELGESANG, THE LONG DARK NIGtr OF THE SOUL (1974) (back flap).
[Vol. 7:477
ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
newsletter, and Department officials report that it is frequently used to
bring human rights issues to the direct attention of the Secretary of State.
Because the necessary cooperation and openness are lacking in the State
Department-NGO relationship, there is a certain amount of mistrust be-
tween the two. While some Department representatives regard NGOs as
objective, others view some NGOs as hypocritical, inaccurate Communist
agencies which focus only on right-wing governments."' Accordingly, while
some NGOs acknowledge the cooperation of Department officials, at the
same time they question the extent to which such officials can influence
policy.
Because of these somewhat conflicting goals and the resulting lack of
cooperation and openness, it may be more accurate to characterize the
State Department-NGO relationship as one of "creative tension." The
existence of tension is inherent in the pursuit of often discordant goals. The
relationship, however, could become more creative. At present NGOs func-
tion as a source of information for the Department and, through the Con-
gress, act as a prod to which the Department must react. But NGOs
recognize that the Department, as the foreign policy voice of the executive
branch, has a greater potential for influencing the implementation of
human rights in Latin America. ' For this reason, NGOs should cultivate
closer associations with members of the Policy Planning Staff and the
Open Forum Panel so that they could have a more direct input into United
States human rights policy toward Latin America. NGOs should also tap
potential State Department influence by establishing an NGO Advisory
Committee on human rights with close links to the Department.'" Such a
committee, outside the bureaucracy, could speak out freely against human
rights violations in Latin America with an impartial and independent voice
and yet at the same time provide the Department with fresh initiatives.
The Human Rights Working Group of the Coalition for a New Foreign and
Military Policy, a Washington-based association of human rights NGOs,
has the potential to become an NGO Advisory Committee, but it lacks the
official representation of the more established international NGOs, such
as Al, ICJ, and ILHR.11 Such a link with the Department, however, needs
215 Uruguay and Paraguay Hearings, supra note 24, at 117. See Ottaway, supra note 50, at
§B, at 5, col. 3.
211 United States Policy and Human Rights, note 204 supra.
21' International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 20, at 481, 516-18;
Human Rights in the World Community Report, supra note 182, at 12.
Z"I Ottaway, note 50. See Quigley Interview, note 57 supra. Member NGOs of the Human
Rights Working Group of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, have both
individual and collective roles. They have the following functions: (1) influence legislation
by informing Congress; (2) influence financial policy of the United States' and its lending
institutions; and (3) influence the Department of State. The Human Rights Working Group,
which originated in late 1975, is a coalition of remnants of antiwar groups and those commit-
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to be developed in order to facilitate a close and intimate interface between
the private and public sectors on current human rights problems. Perhaps
President Carter's emphasis of human rights1 ' will provide the impetus for
a more creative State Department-NGO relationship.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the struggle to promote human rights there are no final victories. The
implementation of human rights cannot be effectuated if one geographic
area or type of political system is singled out for its violations. Human
rights is a complex issue which is interwoven with political, socio-
economic, and national security factors such that no geographic area or
political system can claim to be free from the taint of abusing human
rights. To effectively implement human rights an impartial, politically
independent, persistent "organized concern" is required. NGOs have pro-
vided this "organized concern" in Latin America. Some NGOs, such as AI
and ICJ, express this "organized concern" through careful research and
selective dissemination of human rights violations, while others such as
WOLA, rely more on personal contact with public elites. But whatever
methods are used, NGOs need to exert a more consistent and coordinated
effort, particularly with regard to IACHR and the Department of State, in
order to more effectively prod these public elites to act in Latin America.
The NGOs' reputation for credible, nonpartisan information, which allows
these organizations to publicly allege human rights violations where gov-
ernments or intergovernmental organizations cannot, must also be
strengthened. Such improvements in NGO operations, however, require
greater funding than NGOs now have available. The extent to which NGOs
can resourcefully resolve these problems will determine their success in
implementing internationally recognized human rights in Latin America.
Philip L. Ray, Jr.
J. Sherrod Taylor
ted to promotion of international human rights. It uses mailing lists from the antiwar era.
Of the NGOs examined, only WOLA and NCC are officially members of the Coalition.
Z See Address by The Honorable Cyrus Vance, Law Day, University of Georgia (Apr. 30,
1977), reprinted in 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 223 (1977).
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